

Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

JAN 6 1979

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

January Term, 1979

No. _____

78 - 1084

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY - Petitioner

versus

BARRY VAUGHN WILLIAMS - Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

ROBERT F. STEPHENS

Attorney General

PATRICK B. KIMBFRLIN, III

Assistant Attorney General

REID C. JAMES

Assistant Attorney General

Capitol Building

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Question Presented	2
Constitutional Provisions	2
Statement of the Case and of the Law.....	2- 6
Reasons for Granting the Writ.....	6-14
Conclusion	14
Proof of Service.....	15
Appendix	17-20
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.....	17-19
Mandate of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.....	20

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

January Term, 1979

No. _____

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases:	PAGE
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967).....	12
Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969).....	12
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441 (1935).....	10
Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965)	12
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. ___, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (rendered May 30, 1978)....	2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Whorton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 570 S. W. 2d 627 (rendered July 25, 1978).....	7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14
Miscellaneous:	
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 28 USC § 1257(3).....	2, 9

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY - - - Petitioner

v.

BARRY VAUGHN WILLIAMS - - - Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

The petitioner, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversing the conviction of the respondent in the Jefferson Circuit Court at Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.

OPINION BELOW

The Trial Court rendered no written opinion in this case. A Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam was rendered by the Kentucky Supreme Court on July 25, 1978. It is printed in the appendix to this petition beginning at page 17. The Mandate of the Supreme Court of Kentucky denying the Petitioner's motion for rehearing and modification appears in the appendix at page 20.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court was entered on July 25, 1978. A timely petition for rehearing and modification was denied by that Court on October 10, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 USC § 1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Kentucky Supreme Court Misinterpreted and Misapplied to This Case the Prior Decision of This Court in *Taylor v. Kentucky*, 436 U. S. ___, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978)?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fourteenth Amendment

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS

The respondent, Barry Vaughn Williams, was indicted along with a codefendant, Donna Rhea Tate, by the Jefferson County Grand Jury, Jefferson County,

Kentucky, of wilful murder in the shooting death of Kenneth Ray Smith. Both Williams and Tate entered pleas of not guilty, and proceeded to trial on September 20-22, 1976.

Donna arrived in Louisville from Tennessee in early 1974, met the decedent, and shortly thereafter moved in with him. Failing in other pursuits, Donna turned to prostitution for a livelihood with Smith acting as her procurer. At this time Smith also acted in that capacity for several other girls, assigning each a daily "quota." When Donna failed to meet her quota she was beaten.

This eventually led to her leaving Smith, after which she met Barry Williams. Donna thereafter moved in with Williams and began to give him the money she earned from prostitution. Williams, however, contrary to Donna's testimony, denied that he acted as her procurer.

Williams was aware of Donna's past relationship with Smith, and had met him on a prior occasion when he came to the house he and Donna shared, asking that she return to him. William Clapton, who visited Williams after this incident, testified he overheard an argument between him and Donna in which Williams stated that he would kill Smith if he came around again.

According to Donna's version of the shooting, she had suggested to Williams that they go to the Gay Nineties Bar so that she could talk to a friend, Cookie Murrell. On the way they met Tom Lacey, a friend of Williams. Williams told Donna that Lacey would

be a good "date", and that she could get a lot of money from him.

A short time later, Smith arrived at the bar and asked to talk to Donna. She refused. Thereafter Williams approached Smith, who had been barred from the area night clubs, and told him that Donna would not talk to him. Smith appeared to leave, and Donna indicated to Williams that she wanted to go home in order to "turn a date" with Lacey.

Donna left the bar first, went to the car, and locked the doors, fearing Smith was still in the area. Williams and Lacey followed, and Smith walked up behind them. Williams entered the car on the driver's side. An argument thereupon developed between Donna and Smith. Williams attempted to drive away but Smith stood in the car's path. Williams asked that he move, but Smith refused. An argument ensued between them. When Smith walked around to the driver's side of the car Williams pulled his gun and shot him. He then drove off dropping Lacey a short distance away and warning him that he should say nothing of the shooting.

Having returned home, Williams told Donna that he had two previous manslaughter charges against him, and would go to prison if he were arrested. He then persuaded her to say that she shot Smith as everyone knew of his mistreatment of her and would believe she acted in self-defense. In the next several days Donna admitted that she shot Smith to no less than seven people, and made a statement to that effect to the police on the day of her arrest. However, after talking to

several friends and considering her predicament, Donna denied the shooting, stating instead that Williams shot Smith.

Williams' version of the shooting differed in some detail from Donna's. He admitted that he carried a gun in the course of his employment with a private security firm, and always left it on the dashboard of his car when off-duty. On the evening of September 15, 1974, he and Donna went to the Gay Nineties Bar and sat with a third party, unknown to him, but a friend of Donna's. Smith arrived shortly thereafter, but left when Donna refused to talk to him. Donna and the man they had sat with then left, while Williams finished his beer. Once outside Williams saw Donna jump into his car and attempt to lock the doors. However, Smith, who had returned, pulled the door open on the passenger side of the car before she could do so, and grabbed her arm. Williams ordered Smith out of his car, but the argument between him and Donna continued. When Williams attempted to back his car out of the parking lot, Smith ran around to the driver's side of the car and an argument ensued between them. Williams then heard a shot, saw a flash in front of his face, and observed Donna with his gun in her hand.

Williams and Donna went to the hospital that evening and stayed until 5 a.m. the next morning. While he knew Smith's condition was serious, Williams stated that he did not learn of his death until he was arrested. He also added that he had never been charged with manslaughter nor convicted of a felony.

There were two eyewitnesses to the shooting. Michael Elias, was in a car behind Williams' attempting to leave the parking lot when the shots were fired. He testified that three people were in the Williams' car, and that the *driver*, who was Williams, *stuck a gun out of the window and shot Smith*. The other witness, Janice Windom, stated that she could not see who fired the shot but that Smith was shot while standing on the driver's side of the car.

The investigating officer, Detective Richard Siclari, testified that he interviewed Smith at the hospital on the evening of the shooting, and that Smith informed him that Barry Williams and Donna Tate had shot him.

On the morning before his death Smith's pastor, Reverend George Erwin, visited him in the hospital. Smith asked Reverend Erwin to pray for him because *he knew of his impending death*. Later that day Smith's mother visited him, and testified that her son told her at least three times that *Williams had shot him*.

Williams was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Donna Tate was acquitted. Judgment was entered against Williams on the jury's verdict sentencing him to a term of twenty-one (21) years imprisonment.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has misinterpreted and incorrectly applied a prior decision of this Court, *Taylor v. Kentucky*, 436 U. S. ___, 98 S. Ct., 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (rendered May 30, 1978), to the

case at bar. In *Whorton v. Commonwealth*, Ky., 570 S. W. 2d 627 (rendered July 25, 1978) the Supreme Court of Kentucky interpreted *Taylor v. Kentucky* "to mean that when an instruction on the presumption of innocence is asked for and denied there is reversible error."¹ (Id at 633). The foregoing interpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* requires *automatic reversal* in every criminal case where a request for such an instruction is denied regardless of the circumstances of the case or the possible application of harmless error principles. The petitioner respectfully submits that such an interpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* is incorrect.

In *Taylor v. Kentucky*, 436 U. S. ___, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (rendered May 30, 1978), this Court held that *under the facts* of that case a Kentucky conviction had to be reversed when a request for a presumption of innocence instruction had been refused by the trial court. On June 7, 1978, a week after the *Taylor* decision had been rendered by this Court, *Whorton v. Commonwealth* came before the Supreme Court of Kentucky for oral argument.² One of the

¹The petitioner has previously filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky based upon that court's decision in *Whorton v. Commonwealth*, which is now pending before this Court in *Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Harold Whorton*, October Term, 1978, No. 78-749. A similar petition, also presently pending before this Court, is *Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Ralph Brannon*, October Term, 1978, No. 78-750. The issue presented in the *Whorton* and *Brannon* petitions is the same as that presented in the instant petition.

²After the decision in *Taylor v. Kentucky* by this Court, but before the issuance of the opinion in *Whorton v. Commonwealth* by the Kentucky Supreme Court on July 25, 1978, the Kentucky
(Footnote continued on following page)

issues of that case was whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a requested instruction on presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court of Kentucky subsequently rendered its Opinion on July 25, 1978, in *Whorton v. Commonwealth*,⁸ and, with respect to the presumption of innocence instruction issue, stated as follows:

"In *Taylor* a judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court was reversed because the trial court declined to instruct the jury that the law presumes a defendant innocent—and this despite the fact that on *voir dire* the jurors had already signified that they understood that proposition! If the trial court's 'truncated discussion of reasonable doubt . . . was hardly a model of clarity,' as remarked in *Taylor*, we must confess that we have a similar difficulty with the *Taylor* opinion itself.

The dissenting members of our court feel that the holding in *Taylor* is confined to the facts of the case. They draw that inference from the next-to-last sentence of the opinion (emphasis added):

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Court of Appeals—an intermediate state appellate court—affirmed convictions in two cases involving requested instructions on presumption of innocence wherein that court distinguished *Taylor v. Kentucky* on its facts. *Gully v. Commonwealth*, File No. CA-2048-MR, and *Stewart v. Commonwealth*, File No. CA-1963-MR. These cases were not to be published, and are not cited here as authority, but to apprise this Court chronologically of the impact of *Taylor v. Kentucky* in Kentucky.

⁸On the same day as the *Whorton* decision the Supreme Court of Kentucky also reversed the instant case and *Avery v. Commonwealth*, File No. 78-SC-75-MR by Memorandum Opinions. In both cases requests for instructions on presumption of innocence were denied by the trial court. Petitioner intends to also file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in *Avery*.

'We hold that on the facts of this case the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'

Admittedly, the weight of evidence against Whorton was far greater than it was against the defendant in *Taylor*. But does the Supreme Court actually mean to suggest that a defendant's right to the instruction can be made, ultimately, to stand or fall on the weight of the evidence in a given case? If so, then every case in which the trial court refused to give it will have to be decided according to the Chapman-Harrington harmless-error test. If that was the intention, it would have been considerate of the court to say so. It may be that the question of harmless error was not argued in that case, but 'a model of clarity' would have left a clean cut rather than a jagged stump. After all, it might reasonably have been foreseen that this court would have to apply the decision to a goodly number of other cases then in the process of appeal in this state, Whorton's being but one of them.

Those of us in the majority would like to be able to hold that this newly-declared constitutional requirement is subject to the harmless-error rule, but we are afraid it might not stick. We know very well that in actuality *Taylor* was no more 'prejudiced' in his case than Whorton was in this one. Yet *Taylor* contains no hint that it might have been appropriate to consider whether the error was in fact prejudicial. To bring this discussion to a merciful end, we read *Taylor* to mean that when an instruction on the presumption

of innocence is asked for and denied there is a reversible error. If it means something short of that, we shall welcome further enlightenment from the only source that seems to be able either to construe or to amend the Constitution.

The judgment is reversed with directions for a new trial."

The aforementioned language in *Whorton* constituted an unexpected and surprise interpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Rehearing and Modification in *Whorton* urging the court to apply the harmless-error doctrine. However, the petition was subsequently denied on October 10, 1978, and a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is now pending before this Court, styled *Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Harold Whorton*. The instant case, wherein respondent urged four (4) separate allegations of error on appeal, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, citing *Taylor* and *Whorton*, solely upon the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction on presumption of innocence without regard to the circumstances of this case. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari now results. Compare *Herndon v. Georgia*, 295 U. S. 441 (1935).

It is the position of the petitioner that the Supreme Court of Kentucky has misinterpreted the meaning of *Taylor v. Kentucky* in *Whorton v. Commonwealth* and has misapplied that case to the one at bar. This misinterpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* poses a serious hindrance to the effective administration of criminal

justice in Kentucky and will require the *automatic reversal* of numerous state criminal convictions where the accused requested, but was denied, an instruction on presumption of innocence.

In the case at bar the respondent was convicted *on the strength of the victim's dying declarations and the testimony of two eyewitnesses*. The evidence presented by the prosecution was far more substantial than that presented in *Taylor v. Kentucky*. While several objections were entered relative to the Commonwealth's summation, perusal of the challenged passages clearly reveals a lack of prejudice such as existed in *Taylor*. And, unlike *Taylor*, no harmful inferences were made with respect to the indictments. Moreover there were no suggestions made in this case that respondent's mere status as a defendant would in itself tend to establish guilt—unlike *Taylor v. Kentucky*. Finally, the totality of the evidence in this case, unlike *Taylor*, cannot be described as a mere swearing contest.

Perusal of the decision of this Court in *Taylor v. Kentucky* seems to indicate that that decision turned solely upon its rather unique and unusual facts. The numerous extraneous circumstances which occurred during the trial in the *Taylor* case were specifically noted by this Court and, *when they were considered together*, appeared to establish the basis for the violation of Taylor's constitutional rights. The petitioner maintains that absent such similar factual circumstances during trial no such constitutional violation would necessarily occur. This is particularly true in the case at bar where, as just previously noted in detail,

the circumstances of this case are not all similar to those in *Taylor v. Kentucky*. Therefore, this case should have been considered on its own facts and circumstances and not automatically reversed because the trial court refused to give the requested instruction on presumption of innocence.

However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has interpreted *Taylor v. Kentucky* to mean "that when an instruction on the presumption of innocence is asked for and denied there is a reversible error." Under the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in *Whorton* the respondent's conviction in this case and in every case pending in Kentucky must be automatically reversed without regard to the circumstances of the case, the nature of the evidence adduced at trial, or the manner in which the case was prosecuted and defended by counsel or presided over by the trial court. The petitioner submits that this interpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* as set out by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in the *Whorton* case is incorrect and that this Court should grant a writ of certiorari to review this matter and to correct the *Whorton* decision. Compare *Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox*, 379 U. S. 650, 652 (1965). Specifically, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and vacated with respect to the Taylor issue to be reconsidered in light of applicable harmless-error cases of this Court such as *Harrington v. California*, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), and *Chapman v. California*, 386 U. S. 18 (1967).⁴

⁴In its Petition For Rehearing and Modification before the Supreme Court of Kentucky in *Whorton*, the petitioner estimated

(Footnote continued on following page)

It is the position of the petitioner that *Taylor v. Kentucky* does not mean that a state criminal conviction in Kentucky must be reversed automatically when a requested instruction on presumption of innocence is refused by the trial court. It is our belief that *Taylor v. Kentucky* does not create a rule of law requiring such an instruction as a *sine qua non* in Kentucky criminal cases.⁵ In fact, it appears to the petitioner that under *Taylor v. Kentucky* any alleged federal constitutional impact of such an instruction, whether requested or not, would depend wholly on the

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

that between 20 and 80 criminal cases would be automatically reversed due to that court's interpretation of *Taylor v. Kentucky* in *Whorton v. Commonwealth*. Such automatic reversal under *Whorton* has recently been applied to *Miller v. Kentucky*, No. 77-6912, wherein this Court granted an accused's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 2, 1978, reversed and vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, and ordered that the case be reconsidered in light of *Taylor v. Kentucky*. Miller's conviction had been affirmed by the state appellate court before this Court rendered its decision in *Taylor*. Upon remand from this Court to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Miller's conviction was automatically reversed on November 21, 1978, based upon *Whorton*. A Petition for Rehearing and Modification based upon that reversal is presently pending in the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

⁵The Supreme Court of Kentucky amended Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.56, effective July 1, 1978, requiring a presumption of innocence instruction in every criminal case. That Rule reads as follows:

"(1) In every case the jury shall be instructed substantially as follows: 'The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime, and the indictment [or other accusatory document] shall not be considered as evidence or as having any weight against him. You shall find the defendant not guilty unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty. If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that he is guilty, you shall find him not guilty [and if you find him guilty but have a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the offense of which he is guilty, you shall find him guilty of the lower degree].'

"(2) The instructions should not attempt to define the term 'reasonable doubt'."

circumstances of each criminal case and it would be only in those cases having exceptional circumstances, such as in Taylor v. Kentucky, where the absence of such instruction whether requested or not would result in a violation of an accused's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of Kentucky in its Opinion in *Whorton v. Commonwealth* has clearly misinterpreted the decision of this Court in *Taylor v. Kentucky*. But even in the decision in *Whorton v. Commonwealth*, the Supreme Court of Kentucky clearly indicated that it was unsure of the meaning and import of this Court's decision in *Taylor v. Kentucky* and would welcome "further enlightenment" from this Honorable Court with respect to what *Taylor v. Kentucky* means.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should grant a writ of certiorari in this case in order to rectify the misinterpretation and application by the Supreme Court of Kentucky of *Taylor v. Kentucky* with the case at bar.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT F. STEPHENS
Attorney General

PATRICK B. KIMBERLIN, III
Assistant Attorney General

REID C. JAMES
Assistant Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Counsel for Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Patrick B. Kimberlin, III, one of counsel for the petitioner, hereby certify that three (3) copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, this ~~31~~ day of January, 1979, to Hon. Terrence R. Fitzgerald, Chief Appellate Defender of the Jefferson District Public Defender, 200 Civic Plaza, 701 West Jefferson Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202, and Daniel T. Goyette, Deputy Defender, Jefferson District Public Defender, 200 Civic Plaza, 701 West Jefferson Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202, ~~Counsel for Respondent~~.

PATRICK B. KIMBERLIN, III
Assistant Attorney General

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

RENDERED: JULY 25, 1978

78-SC-68-MR

BARRY VAUGHN WILLIAMS - - - - - *Appellant*

*Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
v. Honorable George H. Kunzman, Judge
Indictment No. 154525*

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY - - - - - *Appellee*

AND

78-SC-75-MR

JAMES RONALD AVERY - - - - - *Appellant*

*Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
v. Honorable S. Rush Nicholson, Judge
Indictment No. 159541*

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY - - - - - *Appellee*

**MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM—
REVERSING**—Received July 25, 1978

We consider here today two criminal appeals arising from completely unrelated occurrences in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Although each case has been treated separately up to this point, inasmuch as the same legal issue is dispositive in both, we deem it appropriate to consolidate them for purposes of this opinion.

The appellant in No. 78-SC-68-MR, Barry Vaughn Williams, was convicted on the strength of the victim's dying declarations and the testimony of two eyewitnesses, of voluntary manslaughter in connection with the September 14, 1974, shooting of one Kenneth Smith following a heated

APPENDIX

m
dispute over a mutual female acquaintance. Williams' punishment was fixed at 21 years' imprisonment. At his trial, the indictment against him was read to the jury, and the prosecuting attorney made several remarks during his summation branding Williams as a professional criminal and imploring the jury to convict him as an example to other members of the underworld. Despite Williams' request that the jury be instructed on the presumption of innocence and lack of evidentiary value of an indictment, the jury was given only the instruction on reasonable doubt required by RCr 9.56 as it existed at that time.

The appellant in No. 78-SC-75-MR, James Ronald Avery, was convicted of three counts of armed robbery for his part in the April 24, 1977, holdup of a Convenient Food Mart and two counts of kidnapping for commandeering a car while effectuating his escape. His convictions were based primarily on the positive in-court identification of an off-duty Louisville police officer who was an eyewitness to the crime, and resulted in consecutive 20-year sentences on each count. Avery too requested an instruction on the presumption of innocence but received only the customary instruction on reasonable doubt.

In light of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Taylor v. Kentucky*, ____ U. S. ___, ____ S. Ct. ___, ____ L. Ed. 2d ____ (decided May 30, 1978), we believe that the refusal by the trial court in each of these cases to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt constituted error, and feel that we have no alternative but to grant each appellant a new trial. See *Whorton v. Commonwealth*, Ky., ____ S. W. 2d ____ (decided today).

At those new trials, the trial court shall instruct the jury as required by the newly amended version of RCr 9.56 (effective July 1, 1978).

The judgments against both appellants Williams and Avery are reversed, and their cases remanded for new trials.

All concur except Clayton, J., who dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in *Whorton*.

Attorneys for Appellant Williams:

TERRENCE R. FITZGERALD
DANIEL T. GOYETTE
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
1000 Republic Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Attorneys for Appellant Avery:

TERRENCE R. FITZGERALD
DANIEL T. GOYETTE
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
1000 Republic Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Attorneys for Appellee:

ROBERT F. STEPHENS, Attorney General
REID C. JAMES, Assistant Attorney General
MILES H. FRANKLIN, Assistant Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

OPINION RENDERED: JULY 25, 1978

File No. 78-SC-68-MR

BARRY VAUGHN WILLIAMS

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

*Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
Action No. 154525*

MANDATE—Issued October 10, 1978

The Court being sufficiently advised, delivered herein an opinion per curiam, and it seems to them the judgment herein is erroneous.

It is therefore considered that said judgment be reversed for proceedings consistent with the opinion herein; which is ordered to be certified to said court.

October 10, 1978—Appellee's Petition for Rehearing Denied.

(s) Martha Layne Collins, Clerk